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THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIALISM
By WALTER H. BucK*
In all the welter of words indicating opposition to the
growth of Socialism in the United States and especially
through the extension of Federal power, it has seemed to
me to be remarkable that no attempt has been made to point
out simply and in a few words how the socialists have been
able to attain their ends.
Total power was divided in the Constitution between the
States and the Federal government, and power in the Fed-
eral government was again divided between the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial Departments. This division of
power was not an accident but was deliberately made to
avoid the danger of concentrated power which historical
study had disclosed and which, as we know too well, current
history confirms.
I shall try by referring to a few cases and by considering
the effect of the i6th Amendment to point out how power
has been concentrated in the Federal government, how the
purposes of the framers of our Constitution have been set
aside, and how the way has been cleared for the socialistic
planners.
I make no claim to being a constitutional lawyer and
indeed I think it accurate to say that there are no constitu-
tional lawyers practicing today in the sense in which we
understood and respected such practice in times recently
passed and though some of the great ones remain, their
learning is now of no avail.
It is worth noting too that all of the mischief to our form
of government was not accomplished by what is known as
the "new" court but some of the unfortunate decisions
which paved the way for later gross extensions of Federal
Of the Baltimore City Bar; LL.B., 1907, University of Maryland.
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power were made by the Supreme Court at a time when it
was composed of able, experienced, and conservative judges.
McCray v. U. S.,' involved the constitutionality of the
Federal tax on oleomargarine. The argument against the
tax was that the law was not passed in the exercise of the
Federal taxing power because both on its face and as shown
by the Congressional debates, the so-called tax was passed
not to raise revenue but to destroy or to injure the produc-
tion and sale of oleomargarine, a cheap and healthful item
of food. The opinion was written by Mr. Justice White and
three of the justices dissented. Mr. Justice White in his
opinion had this to say:
"It is, however argued, if a lawful power may be
exerted for an unlawful purpose, and thus, by abusing
the power, it may be made to accomplish a result not
intended by the Constitution, all limitations of power
must disappear, and the grave function lodged in the
judiciary, to confine all the departments within the
authority conferred by the Constitution, will be of no
avail. This, when reduced to its last analysis, comes
to this, that, because a particular department of the
government may exert its lawful powers with the
object or motive of reaching an end not justified, there-
fore it becomes the duty of the judiciary to restrain the
exercise of a lawful power wherever it seems to the
judicial mind that such lawful power has been abused.
But this reduces itself to the contention that, under
our constitutional system, the abuse by one depart-
ment of the government of its lawful powers is to
be corrected by the abuse of its powers by another
department.
"The proposition, if sustained, would destroy all dis-
tinction between the powers of the respective depart-
ments of the government, would put an end to that con-
fidence and respect for each other which it was the pur-
pose of the Constitution to uphold, and would thus be
full of danger to the permanence of our institutions."2
Yet, in the same case Justice White refers to the fact
that the Judicial Department is charged with the duty of
"enforcing" the Constitution. Thus, the court failed in its
195 U. S. 27 (1904)..
gIbid, 54.
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duty of enforcing the Constitution and closed its eyes to
the obvious subterfuge in the oleomargarine act. One may
well wonder what Justice White would think of the "per-
manence of our institutions" if he were here today? And
would it be unfair at this point to quote Bentham's jibe
that "The law is the science of being methodically ignorant
of what everybody knows." ?2a
Block v. Hirsh, had to do with the Emergency Rent Law
in the District of Columbia and the opinion is by Justice
Holmes with three justices dissenting. It was a so-called
''emergency" law which was to expire in two years and
which took away from property owners the right to fix the
rent for their property. The war power of the Federal
government was not invoked and the law was held to be
constitutional. As a result of it, we have today another
"emergency" law with the Federal government regulating
rents in every State in the Union; which is as close to a con-
stitutional farce as can well be imagined.
Even Justice Holmes, however, noted that there were
limits to the legislative powers and declarations of Congress
saying:
"No doubt it is true that a legislative declaration of
facts that are material only as the ground for enacting
a rule of law, for instance, that a certain use is a public
one, may not be held conclusive by the Courts."4
and again
"The only matter that seems to us open to debate is
whether the statute goes too far. For just as there
comes a point at which the police power ceases and
leaves only that of eminent domain, it may be conceded
that regulations of the present sort pressed to a certain
height might amount to a taking without due process
of law."'5
In plain language this means that the Supreme Court must
scrutinize acts to determine their constitutionality and must
2 See, too, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888), and the article
on the great lawyer David T. Watson who lost that case, in 32 Am. Bar
Ass'n. J. 537 (1946).
S256 U. S. 135 (1921).
Ibid, 154.
'Ibid, 156.
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not accept at face value legislative declarations, but we
must ask ourselves whether that language used by Justice
Holmes has any real meaning today. Also, is this not strange
language coming from Justice Holmes who concurred in
McCray v. U. S.6
In Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon,7
considered and disposed of together, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts filed an original suit in the Supreme Court.
The court held under the special provision of the Constitu-
tion, Article 3, Section 2, that Massachusetts had no right
to institute judicial proceedings in the Supreme Court to
protect its citizens.
Mrs. Frothingham, however, was not only a citizen and
taxpayer of Massachusetts but a Federal taxpayer as well,
who had filed her bill in the lower court and her case went
to the Supreme Court on appeal. Mrs. Frothingham had
sued as a taxpayer and such suits are common in many
states, including Maryland, being brought in order to check
illegal payments by public officers.
The act attacked by Mrs. Frothingham was known as
the Maternity Act. The decision in that case was made at
a time when experienced constitutional lawyers held that
the act was unconstitutional because it provided for appro-
priations from the Federal Treasury for a purpose which
was not within the constitutional powers of Congress. Since
that decision, other cases, which will be referred to, have
so broadened the power of the Federal government that it
is hard to conceive of a case where an act passed by Con-
gress for any such purpose would be declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court.
The case hinged on the procedural question of whether
or not the Supreme Court would pass on the constitutional
question or would evade it. Up to the time of the decision
in that case, there were no adverse holdings on the point
of procedure; that is, as to whether or not a taxpayer could
file such a bill. Justice Sutherland who wrote the opinion
said:
6 Supra, n. 1.
"262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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"The right of a taxpayer to enjoin the execution of
a federal appropriation act, on the ground that it is in-
valid and will result in taxation for illegal purposes,
has never been passed upon by this Court. In cases
where it was presented, the question has either been
allowed to pass sub silentio or the determination of it
expressly withheld."'
Nevertheless, the court refused to pass on the constitu-
tionality of the act and disposed of the case by the old
technique of saying that it had no jurisdiction; in other
words, by a "judge made" rule the court again, as in the
McCray case, abdicated its constitutional function.9
In Houston & Texas Railway Co. v. U. S.,10 Justice
Hughes wrote the opinion, which, on the admitted facts
appears to be entirely sound, and yet this case has been
used of late as an authority for purposes which are destruc-
tive of the Constitution. In the Shreveport cases, two Texas
railroads discriminated in favor of Texas shipping points
as against Shreveport, Louisiana, in their interstate rates to
and from points in Texas to Shreveport. After being
ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to desist,
they finally abandoned their objections to the Commission's
order as to "class" and "standard" rates and complied with
the order. However, the Texas Railroad Commission had
fixed "commodity" rates for intrastate haul through Texas
towards Shreveport at rates relatively lower than the in-
terstate rates. The result was to continue to maintain unfair
rates with respect to Shreveport shippers as against Texas
shippers. All the court decided in that case was that the
Interstate Commerce Commission had the right to stop this
discrimination by fixing the relation between the intrastate
rates and interstate rates so as to make the latter uniform.
Wickard v. Filburn," in which Justice Jackson wrote the
opinion, is a great extension of the Shreveport cases and
in it the theory of "affecting" interstate commerce is greatly
expanded.
I Ibid, 486.
9 See Sutherland, Due Process and Dise8tablihment, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1306, 1332 (1949), to the effect that "The rule in the Frothingham case is
Judge-made..."
(Shreveport cases) 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
n317 U S. Il (1942).
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The case involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act
which was intended to limit the production of wheat by the
use of quotas and penalties. Filburn, a farmer in Ohio,
planted 23 acres in wheat which it was customary for him
to use on his own farm for feeding poultry and livestock.
The court, referring to the Sheveport case as authority, held
that Filburn's actions "affected" interstate commerce in
such a way as to bring Filburn within the penalty of the act.
The court refers slightingly to its own former rulings where
the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" interfer-
ence with interstate commerce had confined the Federal
power within reasonable limits, and concludes that the
power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power
to fix prices in such commerce.
In tort cases, the courts have found by experience that
the attempt to discover "cause" must in some practical way
be restricted and accordingly they have evolved the rule
of "proximate" cause which is a well known legal concept."2
The rule laid down in Wickard v. Filburn, however, about
the effect of actions on interstate commerce is without
limits, though the Supreme Court theretofore had set prac-
tical limits in its decisions declaring whether interstate
commerce was substantially "affected". 3
2Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103 et seq. and
223 et seq. (1911).
"One result of the Wickard case is shown by what happened in one
potato-growing county in Maine as follows:
"Thirty one farmers got checks ranging from $100,000 to better than
$450,000 each; 146 were paid $50.000 to $100,000; 468 got $25,000 to
$50,000; and 1200 got $15,000 to $25,000." Am. Mercury, Jan., 1950.
How valuable would it be if someone with the time and patience could
prepare a list of these various "welfare state" acts so as to give us a rough
idea of their cost and operations.
Frank E. Holman, the late president of the American Bar Association, in
his presidential address "Must America Succumb to Statism?" had this to
say about the Federal government in business:
"May I remind you of the extent to which the Government has gone
into business? The Federal Government has organized and operates
over fifty corporations having assets of over $25,000,000,000, which sum
is forty times as great as our biggest public utility, ten times as great
as our biggest railroad, ten times our biggest industrial company, and
about twice the value of all farm buildings in the United States. Of
these government corporations many are not even incorporated under
acts of Congress, but government officials have incorporated them under
the laws of Delaware and other states. They have the form and struc-
ture of private corporations but behind them in their competition with
private enterprise they have the credit and finance and power of govern-
ment." 35 Am. Bar Ass'n. J. 801, 805 (1949).
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Gregg Cartage & Storage Company v. U. S.,14 involved
the grandfather clause of the Motor Carrier Act and is
referred to because the opinion was also written by Justice
Jackson who wrote the opinion in Wickard v. Filburn. In
the course of the opinion, Justice Jackson had this to say:
"How far one by an exercise of free will may deter-
mine his general destiny or his course in a particular
matter and how far he is the toy of circumstance has
been debated through the ages by theologians, philo-
sophers, and scientists. Whatever doubts they have en-
tertained as to the matter, the practical business of
government and administration of the law is obliged to
proceed on more or less rough and ready judgments
based on the assumption that mature and rational
persons are in control of their own conduct."' 5
Now it seems to me the concepts of "cause" and "affect"
are related in thought and that the courts should have made
practical decisions in both cases but in the Filburn case
there was no practical judgment exercised by the court so
that what "affects" interstate commerce, instead of being
limited by the usual legal methods, appears to be without
limits.
The Baltimore Transit case," involved the applicability
of the National Labor Relations Act to the Baltimore Transit
Company, a purely local Maryland corporation. The transit
company's lines were confined to Baltimore City and Balti-
more County, and at no point came near the boundaries of
Maryland. Yet the court held that its activities "affected"
interstate commerce and that the act applied to the transit
company.
Helvering v. Davis,7 involved the constitutionality of
the Federal Old Age Act. No particular power to pass such
an act is to be found in the Constitution. The Federal
government under the Constitution is one of enumerated
powers only and the 10th Amendment specifically provided:
14316 U. S. 74 (1942).
-Ibid, 79.18 (N. L. R. B. v. Baltimore Transit Co.), 140 F. 2di 51 (1944), cert. den.
321 U. S. 795 (1944).
.7 301 U. S. 619 (1937).
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"The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Justice Cardozo, however, writing the opinion of the
Court had no difficulty in finding that this act, though not
within the enumerated powers, was for the "general wel-
fare" of the country. This expression he took from Article
1, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Constitution as follows:
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States;. .."
Jefferson, with prophetic foresight, had considered this
Article. His thought was that if the broad view were taken
of these particular words, then Congress "could do what-
ever they may think or pretend would promote the general
welfare, which construction would make that of itself a
complete government without limitation of power". Such
a construction of the words "general welfare" the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has said would make of the Constitu-
tion so much "waste paper".18
These cases and others which could be cited show that
the Federal government instead of being a government of
limited and enumerated powers is now, in effect, a govern-
ment of general powers. As the powers of the Federal
government when exercised are paramount, it follows that
I "In many of the cases in which the nature and extent of the police
power have been considered, the words 'general welfare' have been added to
that definition and there has been a tendency in some courts to treat that
expression as enlarging the scope of the police power so as to reach an in-
finite variety of objects which could not be referred to any one of the objects
definitely specified in the definition we have given. But in our opinion the
words 'general welfare,' as used by this Court and other courts In defining
the scope of the police power, do not have that effect, but are synonomous
with and referable to the specific objects enumerated in the definition given
above .. ."
"If this were not so, and if the police power were superior to the constitu-
tion and if it extended to all objects which could be embraced within the
meaning of the words 'general welfare,' as defined by the lexicographers,
the constitutions would be so much waste paper, because no right of the
individual would be beyond its reach, and every property right and personal
privilege and immunity of the citizen could be invaded at the will of the
state, whenever in its judgment the convenience, prosperity, or mental or
physical comfort of the public required." Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349,
356-7 (1925), Offutt, J.
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the Federal government has or can draw to itself total
power.
For the Supreme Court today to strike down an act of
Congress as unconstitutional is so unlikely as to be un-
believable. The role of the Supreme Court now, so far as
it affects the Federal government, has been reduced to the
construction or interpretation of Congressional acts and the
results reached have hardly added to the Court's prestige.
In Loewe v. Lawlor,9 the court held that the Sherman
Antitrust Act applied to a labor boycott, the effect of which
was to prevent the transportation of hats in interstate
commerce.
In Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, ° however, the
court held that while the Sherman Antitrust Act applied,
yet the act could not be invoked to prevent interference by
a labor union; the result of which was to prevent the ship-
ment of $800,000 worth of stockings in interstate commerce.
16TH AMVDM T
The powers of the Federal government having been thus
extended it was necessary for the socialistic planners to find
the means to carry out their plans. This they were able to
do conveniently because of the passage of the 16th Amend-
ment which became effective February 25, 1913.
This amendment was passed apparently in order to
overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in Pollock v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Company.2
The amendment was hastily drawn and its drafting has
been criticized: "Thus the proposed amendment presents
the anomaly of a Federal power of taxation absolutely un-
restricted and entirely opposed to the principle of the Con-
stitution requiring either the rule of apportionment or the
rule of uniformity to govern in every instance. '22
The Internal Revenue Acts, passed pursuant to the 16th
Amendment, have, in effect, siphoned into the United States
Treasury a large part of the annual net income of indi-
viduals and corporations all over the United States. Useful
n 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
310 U. S. 469 (1940).
- 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
223 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1909); See also 15 Va. L. Reg. 737, et 8eq. (1910).
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as the amendment was in providing for the costs of war,
emergencies, and for the cost of government operations, its
use today in implementing plans for socialistic schemes can
be accurately described, by those who believed in the Con-
stitution, as unfortunate.
The situation has come to this: that raids on the United
States Treasury cannot now be stopped by invoking consti-
tutional limitations, so that all the raiders have to do is to
force through Congressional Acts.
Pressure group organizations form the battering-rams
and Federal laws are so cunningly drawn that states which
oppose them eventually are made to submit to them, for a
state which refuses its quota gets nothing and finds its
quota paid out to the other states. Maryland is a good illus-
tration of how such things work. Maryland actually gets
back in Federal grants less than it pays the Federal govern-
ment in taxes, so that Maryland sustains a net loss, and yet
when it receives these grants it becomes a party to the
perversion of our constitutional system.
At a recent annual conference of Governors there was
a strong undercurrent against these Federal practices, in
which the Governor of Maryland concurred, but yet it was
found impossible to adopt a resolution condemning them.23
In Maryland, the State Superintendent of our schools,
though affirming his belief in the Constitution and his
opposition to Socialism, was able in a recent legislature to
defeat Joint Resolution No. 5 which protested against
Federal controls and Federal subsidies.
That we are on the way to Federal control of schools
seems certain and as private institutions of learning are
finding it difficult to maintain themselves, the future of
education in America presents an ominous picture.
"COTTON CONSISTENCY. N. Y. World Telegram, Feb. 24, 1950.
More than 100 delegates to a National Cotton Council Meeting in
Memphis have voted resolutions condemning:
Government deficit spending, the Brannan farm plan, compulsory
government health insurance, the FEPC, and other legislative proposals
by President Truman "which invade the rights of individuals and the
states."
The National Cotton Council delegates also voted in favor of:
A $1,500,000,000 government revolving fund to finance cotton exports
when the Marshall Plan ends.
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The concentration of power and the control of education
seem to go hand-in-hand, as witness Hitler, Mussolini and
Stalin. Our public leaders continue to give lip service to
the Constitution and deny belief in Socialism but what they
do in fact is either to float with the socialistic tide or actually
become active in carrying out socialistic practices.
America was able to stand the shock of four years of a
great Civil War and to emerge without substantial injury
to our American constitutional system, yet one serious busi-
ness panic in the 1930's accompanied by the sudden infiltra-
tion of alien ideas into the Executive, Legislative and Judi-
cial Departments of the Government was the occasion for
the collapse of our constitutional system described by Glad-
stone, the great Prime Minister of England, as follows:
"As the British constitution is the most subtle
organism which has proceeded from the womb and long
gestation of progressive history, so the American Con-
stitution is, so far as I can see, the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose
of man."
We Americans had thought that our constitutional sys-
tem was such as to save us from the eternal circle in which
government seems to move from authority to freedom and
from freedom to authority and so on ad infinitum. How-
ever, we must remember that Spinoza, the great philoso-
pher, concluded that "experience had revealed all possible
commonwealths which are consistent with men living in
unity and also the methods by which people may be guided
or kept in fixed bounds", and he was cautious "in holding
out any hope for improvement of the social lot of men".24
At last we look back to the ancient times in Greece
which had been studied by our constitutional fathers and
we are reminded of the words of Polybius who said that
man, apparently the wisest, is really the silliest of all ani-
mals because he is always being deceived by the same
snares and devices; they still have their effect and delude
men as perfectly as if they were never used before.2 5
eCAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEaL (1949).
2 MAHAFFY, GREEK LIFE AND THOUGHT.
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In the light of what has happened and of the position in
which we now find ourselves it seems to be just a little
absurd to talk about the Constitution as though it were still
in full effect. The great and fundamental division of power
between the national government and the states has been
destroyed, property rights have been subjected to a cease-
less and continuing attack in various ways: By the false
use of the taxing power, by setting up of so-called "classes"
for unjust legislation and in many other ways.
The stage for socialism has been perfectly set in the
ways heretofore outlined and yet we know that socialism
has everywhere been a failure when tried in important
countries. Thus in Germany it degenerated into dictator-
ship, not unlike the present situation in Russia. In England
where economic troubles were already great the Socialists
have made them still greater and England with socialism
is floundering on a declining path in the view of all who will
open their eyes to see.
Of Jefferson's "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happi-
ness" and his later "Life, Liberty and Property" only the
protection of personal liberty, important as that protection
is, remains though some of the Supreme Court's latest appli-
cations of the doctrine press it to its extreme limits.26
Eventually, however, it will be found that there can be
no personal liberty without the protection of private
property.
Thus the "new" thinkers of the nihilistic school have
done their worst but the problem still remains and is cer-
tain in the end to become practical and that problem is this:
(1) How can socialism be stopped before it degrades us as
it has degraded others, and (2) how can the rights of the
states be restored, so as to create that balance between the
powers of the national government and the governments of
the states which was intended by the framers of the Con-
stitution, to the end that the citizens of this great country
shall cease looking in childlike faith to a "Great Father" in
Washington who knows best what to do for all of us?
wCassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
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